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Abstract
The 2018 Ontario provincial election marked a decisive shift in the political direction of Canada’s most populous province.
The election brought an end to the long reign of the Ontario Liberal Party (2003–2018), whose government devolved into a
series of scandals that resulted in a third-place finish. The Liberal’s defeat cameat the hands of the Progressive Conservative
Party led by former Toronto city councillor, Doug Ford. The Progressive Conservative’s victory was propelled on the back of
Ford’s deeply populist campaign where he promised to reassert the interests of ‘the people,’ expel the influence of elites
and special interests, and clean up government corruption. This campaign discourse led many political opponents and me-
dia pundits to accuse Ford of importing the nativist, xenophobic, and divisive rhetoric of other radical right-wing populist
leaders. This article advances the argument that rather than representing the importation of ‘Trumpism’ or other types of
radical right-wing populism, Ford’s campaign is better understood within the tradition of Canadian populism defined by
an overarching ideological commitment to neoliberalism. In appealing to voters, Ford avoided the nativist and xenophobic
rhetoric of populist leaders in the United States and Western Europe, offering a conception of ‘the people’ using an eco-
nomic and anti-cosmopolitan discourse centred upon middle class taxpayers. This article makes a contribution to both the
literatures on Canadian elections and populism, demonstrating the lineage of Ford’s ideological commitment to populism
within recent Canadian electoral history, as well as Ford’s place within the international genealogy of right-wing populism.
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1. Introduction
In the wake of the 2016 United States Presidential
Election, Canadian exceptionalism has enjoyed a healthy
resurgence. As its neighbor to south became swept up
in the rising global tide of right-wing populism, Canada
returned to a more pluralistic and progressive style of
politics under Liberal PrimeMinister, Justin Trudeau. The
country’s renewed commitment to liberal pluralism led
many political commentators to confidently conclude
that far right ideologies and populist movements had lit-
tle social or political currency in Canada (Adams, 2017;
“Liberty moves north: Canada’s example to the world”,
2016). However, recent developments have heightened
concern that, like other liberal democracies in the
Western world, Canada too might be susceptible to the
growth of far-right movements. These concerns came to
a head in the 2018 Ontario provincial election, where
right-wing populist leader, Doug Ford, won a majority
government in Canada’s most populous province. Ford’s
election is one of the few recent cases of successful pop-
ulism in Canada, where a growing number of fringe lead-
ers, parties andmovements have adopted the discourses
of populist leaders from other parts of the globe (Budd,
2019). Ford’s brash and common-sense approach to poli-
tics drew comparison to Donald Trump and other radical
right-wing populists, where Ford was accused of champi-
oning the same xenophobic, nativist, and authoritarian
ideology (Kassam, 2018; Marche, 2018; Porter, 2018).
This article advances the arguments that rather than
representing the importation of populist radical right-
wing ideologies that have taken hold in other parts of
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the world, Ford’s campaign is better understood within
the tradition of Canadian right-wing populism defined by
an overarching ideological commitment to neoliberalism.
In campaigning to voters, Ford largely avoided the type
of nativist and xenophobic rhetoric of populist leaders
in the United States and Western Europe, and instead
offered a conception of ‘the people’ using an economic
and anti-cosmopolitan discourse centred upon middle
class taxpayers and opposition to urban elites. This ar-
gument is advanced using a discursive definition of pop-
ulism to analyze a range of campaignmaterial produce by
Ford and the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario
(PC) during the election. This articlemakes a contribution
to both the literatures on Canadian elections and pop-
ulist leadership, demonstrating the lineage of Ford’s ideo-
logical commitment to populism within recent Canadian
electoral history, as well as Ford’s place within a broader
international context of right-wing populism.
2. Theoretical Framework: A Discursive-Genealogical
Approach
In order to place Doug Ford in comparative per-
spective with other right-wing leaders, I adopt a
discursive-genealogical approach that combines ele-
ments of Mudde’s (2007) thin-centred ideology ap-
proach with a discursive definition of populism. Mudde
(2004, p. 543) approaches populism as an “ideology that
considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’
versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics
should be an expression of the volonté générale (gen-
eral will) of the people.” Thisminimal definition accounts
for the various expressions of populism from around
the globe that see populism become combined with
other ‘thicker’ ideologies such as conservatism, liberal-
ism, socialism, or nativism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2011).
Approaching populism as a thin-centred ideology ac-
knowledges that there is no singular or pure form of pop-
ulism, but rather sub-types distinguished based on the
ideologies of different parties and leaders.
Broadly speaking, populism can be bifurcated be-
tween left and right-wing variants. However, there is a
great deal of variation within these two general cate-
gories of populism as well. On the right, we can distin-
guish between what Mudde (2007) refers to as the “pop-
ulist radical right” and the “nonradical populist right.”
The former category includes parties and leaders that
share a common core ideology of nativism, authoritarian-
ism, and populism. The nativism dimension refers to the
combination of nationalism and xenophobia that tends
to manifest itself in proposals to facilitate the realization
of a homogenous nation-state, whereas the pillar of au-
thoritarianism refers to the ideological belief in an or-
dered society secured through an emphasis on law and
order and punitive moralism. The nonradical populist
right is a more diverse group of actors comprising those
who combine a core right-wing ideology with populism
while eschewing the extreme ideological tenets of the
radical populist right.
One sub-type within this grouping is neoliberal pop-
ulism. The concept of neoliberal populism was first de-
veloped by Betz (1994), who used the term to catego-
rize populist leaders and parties emerging in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Neoliberal populism can be un-
derstood as the combination of a primary ideology of
economic liberalism with populism, typically expressed
in a promotion of free market economics, individual lib-
erty, and a commitment to traditional family structures
and private property. Neoliberal populism differs signif-
icantly from the populist radical right. Brubaker (2017)
argues that we can understand ideological differences
between sub-types of populism based on the intersec-
tion between vertical and horizontal dimensions of op-
position. According to Brubaker (2017), populism rests
on the social construction of a vertical dimension of op-
position where ‘the people’ are pitted against some class
of political, economic, and cultural elites. There is also
a horizontal dimension comprised of an insider-outsider
distinction between ‘the people’ and groups of ‘others’
constructed along racial, ethnic, economic, and cultural
lines. Neoliberal populism can be understood within this
framework as defining vertical and horizontal opposi-
tion in primarily economic terms. In this way, neolib-
eral populists stand out from the recent wave of radi-
cal right-wing populists. As Inglehart and Norris (2016)
argue, the recent global wave of populism is reflective
of a value shift where the traditional left-right economic
cleavage that has defined party competition in post-war
Western democracies has been displaced by a cultural
continuum arranged between exclusionary populist val-
ues on one pole and liberal cosmopolitan values on the
other. This new cultural continuum of values is what ac-
counts for the recent surge of populism, where leaders
and parties have abandoned or blended traditional eco-
nomic ideologies in favour of a politics focused on cul-
tural backlash. Neoliberal populists thus stand out from
this broader realignment of values in that their ideology
and policy agenda is defined by the traditional left–right
divide while omitting the core features of other forms
of populism defined by a commitment to nativism, xeno-
phobia, and authoritarianism (de Lange & Mügge, 2015;
Inglehart & Norris, 2016).
While useful in parsing apart ideological variants of
leaders and parties, the prevalence of the thin-centred
ideology conception of populism has also led critics to
identify a number of inherent challenges and shortcom-
ings. As both Aslanidis (2015) and Moffitt (2016) have
highlighted, the ideological approach infers that we un-
derstand populism as a fixed attitude of a leader or party.
In other words, a particular political party or leader is ei-
ther populist or not. This inherent binary between pop-
ulists and non-populists belies research findings noting
periodic forays into populism among leaders and par-
ties not typically thought to be populist. This is partic-
ularly prescient in the Canadian literature on populism,
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where a number of scholars have persuasively demon-
strated theHarper government’s periodic affinity for pop-
ulist appeals (Kelly & Puddister, 2017; Sawer & Laycock,
2009; Snow & Moffitt, 2012). The ideological approach
has trouble accounting for these populist displays by
non-populists, representing a significant incongruence
between theory and empirical reality. Thus, the ideolog-
ical approach provides an imprecise empirical explana-
tion of populism by failing to account for its strategic use
in discourse among a wide array of leaders beyond those
with a coherent populist worldview.
In noting this issue with the thin-centred ideology ap-
proach, I adopt an alternative discursive approach that
understands populism as a discursive frame by which
political ideologies, grievances, and interests become
packaged and expressed (Aslanidis, 2015; Bonikowski
& Gidron, 2016; de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann,
& Stanyer, 2018). In assuming this approach, I define
populism as an anti-elite discourse that invokes “the
supremacy of popular sovereignty to claim that corrupt
elites are defrauding ‘the People’ of their rightful po-
litical authority” (Aslanidis, 2015, p. 96). Similar to the
thin-centred ideology approach, this definition retains
the antagonistic divide between ‘the people’ and the
elites/political establishment. However, in approaching
populism as a discourse, the site of inquiry shifts to a fo-
cus on the various types of speech acts offered by politi-
cal leaders andparties. Like the ideological approach, this
discursive definition of populism retains a degree of con-
ceptual ‘thinness’ allowing for an accounting of the differ-
ences between various enactments of populism. More
importantly for this article, this discursive approach is
consistentwith the identification of genealogical variants
of populism based on ideology discussed above. As a flex-
ible andmodular discourse, populism can be deployed by
a range of different actors with various ideological dispo-
sitions and policy agendas. It is with this strength inmind
that I apply the discursive-genealogical approach to ana-
lyze and compare Doug Ford’s 2018 electoral campaign
against the global roster of right-wing populists.
3. Canadian Electoral Politics and Right-Wing Populism
A complete review of the history of right-wing pop-
ulism in Canada dating back to Confederation is well be-
yond the scope of this article. However, it is possible
to briefly summarize some of the general characteristics
of Canadian populist movements, leaders, and parties.
One of themost defining characteristics of Canadian pop-
ulism is the influence of regional political cultures, iden-
tity issues, and grievances.Many of themost well-known
and successful populist movements in Canada have been
organized around regional/provincial interests where
right-wing politicians and parties have positioned them-
selves as opponents of an unaccountable and out-of-
touch federal government. This is especially true ofmove-
ments that have developed inWestern Canada, where an
engrained sense of regional alienation has helped to fuel
several highly successful populist movements and par-
ties. There are numerous examples of these throughout
history including the Social Credit Party that governed
Alberta from 1935 to 1968, Saskatchewan’s Progressive
Conservative Party during the 1970s and, perhaps most
notably, the creation of the federal Reform Party in the
late 1980s (Wiseman, 2006). These parties and their
leaders have expressed to varying degrees an ideolog-
ical commitment to asserting the interests of Western
Canadians against the intrusive and undemocratic poli-
cies of the federal government. The exact nature of
these articulations has evolvedover time. During themid-
20th century, right-wing Western Canadian populists fo-
cused their appeals on articulating the interests of small
businesses and individual consumers whose purchasing
power and economic wellbeing, they argued, had been
curtailed by a cadre of Eastern-based financial interests,
government planners, bureaucrats, and political parties
(Laycock, 1990, p. 206). Leaders and parties during this
period advocated for reforms to democratic institutions
that would scale back the influence and power of Eastern
financial interests and replace them with plebiscitarian
forms of democracy that would allow ‘the people’ direct
input into fiscal policy-making (Laycock, 1990, p. 234).
These populist discourses evolved considerably begin-
ning in the late 1970s, where a new wave of Western
populist leaders and parties emerged sparked by the in-
troduction of Pierre Trudeau’s National Energy Program
andmega-constitutional debates surrounding the accom-
modation of Quebec. This subsequent wave of Western
populism—typified by Preston Manning and the Reform
Party—helped to displace the Progressive Conservatives
as the de facto federal party of the right in Canada
while opposing proposals for asymmetrical federalism
that would grant Quebec increased power and jurisdic-
tion relative to other provinces. Populists during this pe-
riod also targeted federal social programs and policies
that they saw as unfairly benefitting special interests
at the expensive of middle-class taxpayers and wealth
producing provinces. A through line to earlier Western
populist movements was continued support for direct
democracy reforms such as the increased use of refer-
enda, the creation of a triple-E senate, and the popular
ratification of constitutional amendments.
While populism in Canada is most widely associated
with Western Canada, an overlooked tradition of right-
wing populism also exists in Eastern Canada. Here, pop-
ulism has also taken on a regional flavor, with populist
grievances taking root in the form of anti-Francophone
sentiments. The two most notable examples of this
are the New Brunswick Confederation of Regions Party
(1989–2002) and the People’s Alliance of New Brunswick
(2010–present). The Eastern tradition of Canadian pop-
ulism has been largely concentrated around efforts
aimed at repealing official bilingualism mandating the
dual use of English and French in federal and provincial
public services. Populists in the East have sought to po-
sition themselves as the voice of English-speaking pop-
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ulations whose interests, they argued, have been sacri-
ficed by establishment parties and politicians who have
catered to francophone voters (Martin, 1995). Like their
Western Canadian counterparts, the Eastern tradition of
populism has also focused its efforts on promoting in-
dividual freedom and responsibility, rolling back the en-
titlements of special interests, and introducing market-
based alternatives to government services (Gordon &
Chouinard, 2019).
In being shaped primarily by regional and linguistic
divides, populism in Canada has also been defined by
the relative absence of radical positions on issues of cul-
ture and immigration. Instead, Canadian iterations of
populism, especially at the federal level, have tended
to gravitate toward neoliberal ideologies and discourses
while largely eschewing the nativism and xenophobia
that has characterized populist leaders and parties in
other parts of the world. Canadian populist discourse
has generally reflected the underlying tenets of neolib-
eral ideologywhere ‘the people’ have been defined using
economic signifiers and elites criticized for mishandling
and wasting public resources and tax dollars. The pri-
mary political agenda of Canadian populists has focused
on scaling back the entitlements of the welfare state
while advocating for reduced taxation and an enhanced
private sector in Canadian society. Canadian populist
discourse has repeatedly invoked the undue influence
of special interests defined largely as “feminist lobby
groups, native organizations, organized labour, multicul-
tural, linguistic and ethnic groups, the management of
most crown corporations and state agencies, and public
sector unions” (Laycock, 1994, p. 217). As Laycock (1994)
notes, the influence of these out-groups has largely been
criticized through the ideological prism of neoliberalism,
where their accommodation has been lambasted as pro-
ducing political outcomes that unfairly skew the natu-
ral market-based distribution of social and economic re-
sources while violating the inalienable principles of for-
mal individual equality. While generally opposed to a
generous immigration policy and official multicultural-
ism, populists in Canada have evolved to frame their op-
position using the language of economics and fiscal re-
straint as oppose to appeals to ethnic identity or social
concerns (Koning, 2019).
In Ontario, populism has been especially rare com-
pared to other parts of Canada. However, when it has
taken root, it has generally come in the formof neoliberal
populism where the focus has been on reducing govern-
ment expenditures through the elimination of social pro-
gramming.Mike Harris’ Progressive Conservative govern-
ment of the mid-1990s is the most prominent example
of right-wing populism at the provincial level in Ontario.
Inspired by the success ofManning and the Reform Party
at the federal level of politics, Harris helped to usher
in what he and the party called ‘the commonsense rev-
olution.’ Harris’ government sought to capitalize on a
growing sense of economic uncertainty connected to
the influence of globalization and a corresponding de-
cline in institutional confidence to push forward a ne-
oliberal agenda focused on reducing the size and spend-
ing of the Ontario government and replacing it with
free market reforms and greater personal responsibility
(Woolstencroft, 1997). Apart from this brief flourish at
the provincial level of politics, populism has also made
its way into municipal politics in Ontario. The late Rob
Ford—Doug Ford’s brother—brought a similar neoliberal
populistmessage to Toronto City Hall during his tenure as
Mayor. Ford’s appeals to Torontonians rested on a blend-
ing of austerity, anti-elitism, and anti-cosmopolitanism
where he successfully rallied the support of voters in sub-
urban wards of the city against supposedly left-leaning
downtown elites (Thomas & Tufts, 2016). In many ways
Rob Ford’s mayoral run mirrors broader national trends
in right-wing populism in that he largely avoided overt
appeals to nativist or anti-immigrant sentiments in the
course of constructing an ethnically diverse coalition of
support (Kiss, Perrella, & Spicer, 2019; Silver, Taylor, &
Calderón-Figueroa, 2019).
While regionalism and neoliberalism have helped to
shape Canadian populism away from radical ideologies,
there has been a recent uptick in Canadian leaders and
parties engaging with more xenophobic, nativist, and
nationalist forms of populism. Recently, Canadian right-
wing politicians such as Kellie Leitch andMaxime Bernier
have launched political campaigns focused on gathering
support around concerns over immigration, national her-
itage, and illiberal forms of cultural expression (Budd,
2019). Themainstreaming of these exclusionary populist
appeals is connected to broader shifts in right-wing dis-
course both in Canada as well as internationally, where
a growing number of populist leaders in Western demo-
cratic countries have successfully challenged the consen-
sus around immigration and multiculturalism. In light of
this, it isworth considering not only howFord fits into the
global context of right-wing populism, but also whether
or not Ford represents a progression toward a more rad-
ical, nationalistic version of populism in Canada.
4. Context: The 2018 Ontario Provincial Election
The 42ndOntario general electionwas notable on a num-
ber of fronts. Firstly, the election marked a significant
moment of departure in the political direction of the
province. Up until the PCs victory in June of 2018, the
Ontario Liberal Party had enjoyed15 years of consecutive
rule in Ontario. This long period of governance led to the
accumulation of high-profile public scandals and policy
controversies that over time began to sow seeds of mis-
trust among the public toward the ethical integrity and
managerial competency of the Liberals and their leaders.
As a result, the resounding narrative of the 2018 elec-
tion became one of change and which opposition party,
the PCs or New Democratic Party (NDP), were best pre-
pared to offer sound leadership and restore trust in gov-
ernment (Delacourt, 2018). Second, the election was no-
table in regard to the turmoil that occurred in its lead-up.
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In the months prior to the election, the PCs enjoyed a
healthy lead in the polls as it appeared to be a foregone
conclusion that their then leader, Patrick Brown, would
become Ontario’s next premier. However, Brown’s bid
for premier was derailed in January of 2018, when alle-
gations of sexual misconduct levied by two women sur-
faced in the news media. While denying any wrongdo-
ing, under widespread public scrutiny and internal pres-
sure from party leadership, Brown resigned as PC leader
on January 25th, 2018. Brown’s resignation ignited an
unexpected and highly competitive leadership election.
Despite not having any previous experience in provin-
cial or federal politics, former Toronto city councillor,
Doug Ford, narrowly edged out runner-up and veteran
Member of Provincial Parliament, Christine Elliott, on the
third ballot to become the new leader of the PCs. Elliott
lost the leadership contest to Ford despite receiving a
larger share of the overall popular vote amongst PCmem-
bers (51.7%). Ford’s victory came as a result of the com-
plex election system used by the PCs which combines
preferential ballots with equally weighted ridings. Under
the system, each of Ontario’s 124 electoral districts is
worth up to 100 electoral points which are awarded to
candidates based on the weighted percentage of votes
they receive in a riding (Grenier, 2018). This formula
helped Ford to victory as he was able to take a larger
share of electoral points in ridings that he won versus
the share taken in ridings won by Elliott.
With less than three months before the election,
Ford’s entry as leader drastically altered the PC’s strat-
egy and the overall discourse of their campaign. Ford
successfully reshaped the PCs in his own image, restruc-
turing the party’s platform and appeals to voters using
the language of populism. This shift was a far cry from
the traditional political brand of the PCs in Ontario and
the preferred messaging of Ford’s most recent predeces-
sor. While occupying ideological space to the right of
the Liberals and NDP, the PCs have historically been a
centre-right party that has avoidedovert ideological com-
mitments in favour of a pragmatic brand of economic
managerialism and sound political leadership (Malloy,
2017). This traditional posturing was the one adopted by
Patrick Brown, who had reoriented the party toward a
centrist, immigrant-friendly image following the party’s
more hardline shift to the right under former leader, Tim
Hudak (2009–2014). Inheriting the PC’s lead in the polls
following Brown’s resignation, Ford pivoted the party
away from this centrist orientation and initiated a full-
scale adoption of populism. In his election platform, aptly
titled A Plan for the People, Ford offered a suite of cam-
paign promises intended to draw upon popular discon-
tent with the political status quo. Included in Ford’s plat-
form were promises to repeal Ontario’s cap and trade
plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, fire the CEO of
Ontario’s utility provider Hydro One, scrap Ontario’s re-
vised sex-ed curriculum, and launch a full audit of govern-
ment spending under the previous Liberal government
(PC, 2018). These promises were framed as part of a
broader effort by Ford to put ‘the people’ ahead of politi-
cal eliteswho he accused of unfairly benefitting fromgov-
ernment waste andmismanagement to the detriment of
taxpayers. The PC’s political opponents were attacked us-
ing the same typeof populist discourse framedas corrupt
political elites beholden to special interests.
Ford’s populist agenda and discourse proved a suc-
cessful pathway to electoral victory for the PCs. The
party came away with a majority government winning
76 seats to the NDP’s 40, the Liberal Party’s seven and
the Green Party’s one. It is important to note that the
PC’s majority was supported by only 40.5% of the pop-
ular vote. This gap between the popular vote and the
allocation of seats is a common outcome of Ontario’s
single-member plurality electoral system, where 7 of the
last 8 elections held since 1990 have produced majority
governments supported by less than 50% of the popu-
lar vote. Nevertheless, the election demonstrated the ap-
peal of Ford’s populist brand of politics among Ontarians,
particularly those residing in non-urban regions of the
province. Geographically, Ford found the strongest sup-
port in suburban and rural areas, takingmost of the seats
within the Greater Toronto Area and the rural regions lo-
cated in the southern half of Ontario. Demographically,
pre-election polling found that Ford’s support tended
to be strongest among younger voters with less educa-
tion and lower incomes for whom economic pessimism
is high and issues of immigration and globalization are
considered important (EKOS Politics, 2018). This demo-
graphic concentration of support is consistent with sup-
port for other right-wing populists, which tends to be
rooted in a growing sense of political disaffection, back-
lash against globalization, and an opposition to popula-
tion migration (Norris, 2005).
Thus, it would appear that Ford’s adherence to pop-
ulism during the campaign and the profile of his sup-
port mirrors the rise of populists from other parts of
the world. The similarities between Ford and other right-
wing populist leaders, particularly Donald Trump, pro-
voked a great deal of media commentary during the cam-
paign while also serving as the basis of attack for his po-
litical opponents. Ford’s brash, common-sense approach
to politics and right-wing policy agenda left many media
pundits to wonder if the 2018 Ontario provincial election
marked Canada’s very own “Trump moment” (Kassam,
2018). For political opponents, mostly Kathleen Wynne
and the Liberal Party, branding Ford as a cheap imita-
tion of Trump served as a key line of attack during the
election in an effort to court voters supportive of the
PCs but concerned with the importation of divisive right-
wing populism (Powers, 2018). Ultimately, these unflat-
tering comparisons fell short in preventing Ford from be-
coming premier. However, the similarities between Ford
and other right-wing populists warrants further atten-
tion. How closely does Ford’s ideology resemble other
right-wing populists? The remainder of this articlemakes
an effort to place Ford within the global context of right-
wing populism.
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5. Data and Methodology
In analyzing the ideological elements of Ford’s populist
discourse, I follow the approach laid out by prominent
discourse theorist, Teun van Dijk (1995). Van Dijk (1995,
p. 17) argues that we understand ideology as:
The basic frameworks for organizing the social cog-
nitions shared by members of social groups, organi-
zations or institutions. In this respect, ideologies are
both cognitive and social. They essentially function as
the interface between the cognitive representations
and processes underlying discourse and action, on the
one hand, and the societal position and interests of
social groups, on the other hand.
In other words, ideologies form both the interpretive
schemata for individuals as well as the values, principles,
and interests that bind social groups/collectives together.
The task for analysis then is to understand howdiscourse,
in the form of discrete speech acts, functions to persua-
sively convey ideological meaning to inform subjective
and intersubjectiveworldviews. In the context of this arti-
cle, I am interested in understanding the ideological com-
position of Ford’s populist discourse and the degree it re-
sembles the ideological worldviews of other populists.
The analysis I offer below is based on a discourse
analysis of campaignmaterial and public appearances of-
fered by Ford during the official campaign period (May
9–June 7, 2018). Included in the analysis is the PCs of-
ficial party platform, Ford’s performance during 3 offi-
cial leadership debates, as well as campaign videos pro-
duced by the PCs featuring Ford. In total, I have analyzed
40 videos posted on the Ford Nation Live website. The
videos are shot in the style of news segments featur-
ing a journalist reporting on a recent public appearance
by Ford on the campaign trail, a gaffe or scandal involv-
ing another party, or a major policy announcement in-
troduced by the PCs. The analysis of the videos focuses
on both the discursive contours of speech as well as in-
cluded imagery and visuals. As Moffitt’s (2016) work ar-
gues, it is increasingly important that we focus on the vi-
sual self-presentation of populist leaders in light of the
contemporary age of hyper-mediated and stylized poli-
tics. The videos produced by the PCs provide a window
into the role of populist discourse during the campaign
and pertinent material for assessing Ford’s ideological
orientation as expressed in appeals to Ontario voters.
6. Research Findings
6.1. Defining the People: Taxpayers, Government
Insiders, and Radical Special Interests
Across the campaign material produced by Ford and the
PCs, a very clear discursive construction of ‘the people’
emerges. While Ford’s campaign slogan is literally “For
the People,” examining his discourse over the course of
the campaign reveals that Ford’s definition of ‘the peo-
ple’ is confined to and structured around the signifiers
of ‘taxpayers’ and the ‘middle class.’ For Ford, ‘the peo-
ple’s’ interests are those that belong to taxpaying citi-
zens who under the Liberal government have been ex-
ploited by scandals involving government insiders and
political elites. The oppositional framing between taxpay-
ers and well-connected insiders is consistently used to
frame Ford’s policy agenda, especially his opposition to
Ontario’s cap and trade system and his proposals to ter-
minate highly paid public servants (Ford Nation, 2018b,
2018h). Ford’s championing of the taxpayers’ interests
represents the centre piece of his campaign that po-
sitions his prospective PC government as signalling an
“end to the party with taxpayers’ money” and the ush-
ering in of a government that embraces fiscal restraint
and curtails wasteful government spending (Ford Nation,
2018j). However, while Ford’s discursive definition of ‘the
people’ is rooted in class-based appeals, his populist dis-
course largely avoids direct references to working class
Ontarians. Instead, Ford’s definition of the middle class
is confined to entrepreneurs and small business owners.
This is exemplified in the videos released by Ford and the
PC’s announcing tax cuts for the middle class that are ac-
companied by interviews with CEOs, entrepreneurs and
small business owners praising Ford’s proposals and link-
ing them to supporting average hardworking Ontarians
(Ford Nation, 2018f, 2018g). In Ford’s populist discourse,
entrepreneurs become the embodiment of the middle
class and ultimately the vanguard to middle class suc-
cess, serving as job creators and wealth generators for
‘the people.’
Equally important as who ‘the people’ are, is who
‘the people’ are not. Populist discourse hinges on the con-
struction of an elite class whose power operates against
the interests of ‘the people.’ Additionally, populists also
focus their efforts on constructing an identifiable ‘other’
typically in the form of a competing social group that
threatens ‘the people’ in some way. Ford’s populist dis-
course includes consistent and clear elements of anti-
elitism in the form of criticisms of the political establish-
mentwho he claims have been coopted by political elites
and insiders that have used their special political connec-
tions to defraud taxpayers. The construction of elites in
Ford’s discourse emerges primarily out of attacks against
the outgoing Liberal government, who he accuses of sys-
temic corruption and using their authority to enrich their
close friends and colleagues. Ford’s crusade against po-
litical insiders is typified in his criticism of Hydro One’s
CEO who he labels “Kathleen Wynne’s six million dol-
lar man” (Ford Nation, 2018a). Issues involving Ontario’s
main utility provider have been long gestating, beginning
with rapid increases in hydro rates under the Liberal gov-
ernment in the early 2000s. These issues weremagnified
following the Liberal government’s decision inNovember
of 2015 to privatize a portion of Hydro One in order to
pay down provincial debt and fund transit projects. Ford
juxtaposed these longstanding issues with the renumer-
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ation of its CEO and Board of Directors to reinforce the
image of a political establishment designed to enrich the
wealthy at the expense of the middle class. Ford success-
fully positioned himself as the only politician capable of
expelling these unaccountable bureaucratic elites from
power while promising to end the “Liberal practice of
making millionaires from your hydro bills” (PC, 2018).
Ford’s populism also prominently featured declara-
tions against “radical special interests” who serve in the
role of the ‘other’ in his discourse. The groups falling un-
der the banner of special interests never receive a full
articulation, however they are frequently linked to the
NDP and their supporters. Ford largely frames these rad-
ical interests as being opposed to ‘the people’ based on
their resistance to the creation of economic opportuni-
ties and individual prosperity for the middle class. The
construction of special interests in Ford’s discourse re-
tains a distinct geographic dimension, as Ford positions
special interests as being from “downtown Toronto” and
motivated by a desire to eliminate economic opportuni-
ties for those residing in suburban and rural regions of
the province (Ford Nation, 2018i). Radical special inter-
ests received particular attention during the Northern
Leaders’ Debate where Ford accused the NDP of har-
bouring candidates who would close mines and stifle
the development of the forestry industry in Ontario’s
North. The evocation of urban-based radical interests
by Ford echoes the anti-cosmopolitanism that charac-
terized his brother’s populism during his time as Mayor
of Toronto (Silver et al., 2019; Thomas & Tufts, 2016).
Anti-cosmopolitanismplayed a similar role inDoug Ford’s
provincial campaign, where it became a discursive strat-
egy to advance neoliberal reforms aiming to increase pri-
vate sector productivity and eliminate government over-
sight, while strengthening Ford’s appeal amongst subur-
ban and rural voters.
6.2. Performing Crisis: Government Corruption and the
Promise of a Neoliberal Dawn
The populism literature suggests that successful pop-
ulists tend to capitalize on moments of political, social,
or cultural crisis in order to appeal to ‘the people’ and
justify the drastic measures outlined in their policy agen-
das (Taggart, 2000). AsMoffitt (2016) rightly notes, while
traditionally treated as an external trigger, crisis is best
understood as an internal feature of populism that is
rendered present through populist discourse and perfor-
mance. In other words, crisis is something that is imag-
ined and created by populist leaders and parties. In the
case of Ford, the crisis that is brought to bear is primar-
ily economic in nature. Ford’s discourse is heavily struc-
tured around the identification of various institutional
failures including scandals involving Hydro One, the size
of the provincial debt, the impending economic dam-
age of Ontario’s cap and trade plan and lengthy hospital
wait times. Importantly, Ford links these crises together
as a symptom of a broader democratic deficit between
politicians and ‘the people.’ As Ford outlines in his cam-
paign platform: “The problems facing Ontario share one
thing in common: Kathleen Wynne’s Liberal government
just doesn’t care about you anymore” (PC, 2018). Ford
and the PCs draw explicit ties between Liberal scandals,
institutional failings and the unwillingness of establish-
ment politicians to listen to or protect the interests of
Ontarians. This linking of political crisis to democratic rep-
resentation is a common strategy of populists writ large
(Canovan, 1999). In Ford’s version of populism, demo-
cratic representation becomes tied to the abuse and ma-
nipulation of taxpayers, whose freedom and prosperity
are portrayed as being curtailed by unaccountable and
out-of-touch elites.
Importantly, Ford adds a temporal dimension to his
critique of the political establishment by framing the po-
tential of electing an NDP government as exacerbating
this crisis for taxpayers. During the campaign, Ford re-
peatedly argued that the NDP are like the Liberals except
“10 times worse” while referencing the NDP government
of the 1990s as evidence of what would happen if they
were elected. The economic threat of the NDP is crystal-
ized in the following statement given by Ford in a post-
debate scrum:
I’ve talked to hundreds of small businesses. They are
terrified, absolutely terrified about the NDP coming
in. And you knowwhat, you look back, backwhen they
were back in power, they lost 125 000 jobs in less than
4 years, unemployment skyrocketed 28% higher, wel-
fare rates went up. (CBC News, 2018)
This use of the past points to a unique feature of Ford’s
populism. Taggart (2000) argues that populist rhetoric
tends to rely on referential appeals to the past in the
form of an imagined ‘heartland’ that serves as an ide-
alized society structured around the inherent interests
and shared values of ‘the people.’ For Ford, the past is
not praised or positioned as a place to return to, but
rather is an example of what has gone wrong in Ontario.
Instead, Ford casts his populist gaze forward, projecting
an idealized representation of Ontario as a land of unre-
strained individual opportunity: “A new day will dawn: a
day of prosperity, a day of growth, a day of opportunity
this province has never seen before” (FordNation, 2018i).
This imagined Ontario is consistent with Ford’s broader
neoliberal worldview, where the issues and challenges
affecting Ontarians can be boiled down to a lack of indi-
vidual economic freedom stemming from an inefficient,
burdensome and bloated provincial government.
6.3. For the Little Guy: Epistemological Appeals to
Common-Sense and the Sovereignty of ‘the People’
A critical task for populist leaders is not just defining
who ‘the people’ are, but also positioning themselves
as speaking on their behalf (de Vreese et al., 2018). In
other words, it is essential for populist leaders to assert
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themselves as the voice of ‘the people’ and the legiti-
mate expression of the popular will. In Ford’s discourse,
we see this accomplished by epistemological appeals to
common-sense and the linking of policy proposals to di-
alogue with citizens. The early portion of Ford’s cam-
paign was presented in the narrative of a bus tour with
the goal of connecting with ‘the people’ and listening
to their concerns. In a video updating Ford’s campaign,
the reporter featured in the video offers the following
update: “Doug Ford is listening and gathering real in-
formation” while “connecting with people who are dis-
connected from Queens Park” (Ford Nation, 2018d). In
another video highlighting Ford’s attendance at cultural
events, one of his supporters describes Ford as “not your
typical ivory tower type, he cares about connecting with
the people” (Ford Nation, 2018e). These discursive ap-
peals to real, common-sense knowledge play an inte-
gral role in framing Ford’s policy agenda while helping
to sediment his connection with average middle-class
Ontarians. His proposal to cut taxes and reduce waste
are repeatedly framed as part of a broader effort to “put
money back in the pocket of taxpayers” (Ford Nation,
2018d) under the logic that ‘the people’ know how to
spend their money far better than any bureaucrat or
politician. In sum, Ford’s anti-government discourse and
everyman self-presentation function to construct him as
being intimately connected to and bringing expression to
the voice of ‘the people.’
Ford’s positioning of himself as the expression of
the popular will also relies on discursive opposition to
other forms of knowledge. Ford’s critique of the politi-
cal establishment and government services evokes a re-
pudiation of technocratic forms of knowledge and bu-
reaucratic managerialism. This comes out most clearly in
Ford’s promise to end ‘hallway healthcare’ which served
as a central plank of the PC’s policy platform throughout
the campaign. Ford repeatedly blames the issues facing
Ontario’s healthcare system on bureaucratic oversight ar-
guing that “for common-sense Ontarians, we need less
money lining the pockets of bureaucrats and more for
hospital beds” (Ford Nation, 2018c). More importantly
for Ford, politicians are called on to start listening to
frontline healthcare workers and service providers to
gain insight into how healthcare can be made more effi-
cient and cost-effective. The PC’s campaign communica-
tions outlining their plan for healthcare prominently fea-
ture interviews with nurses, doctors, and other service
providers who provide firsthand accounts of issues in the
healthcare system. These representations help to rein-
force the anti-government and free market orientation
of Ford’s populism by challenging the wisdom of govern-
ment planners and lionizing common-sense, experiential
forms of knowledge.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
Doug Ford’s 2018 election campaign provides a use-
ful case study toward understanding both the histori-
cal legacy and future potential of right-wing populism in
Canada. In examining Ford’s discourse, it is quite clear
that his particular brand of populism eschews the ide-
ological tenets that scholars have used to characterize
the populist radical right. In campaigning to Ontarians,
Ford largely avoided deploying xenophobic or nativist ap-
peals to ethnic identity or nationalism. Rather, his dis-
course relied on a neoliberal conceptualization of ‘the
people’ structured around economic signifiers focused
on appealing to a shared sense of middle-class identity.
In Ford’s populist worldview, the issues and interests that
matter are those that belong to middle-class taxpayers
whose collective prosperity has been limited by ineffi-
cient bureaucrats and corrupt politicians. This populist
vision of society not only provided the jumping off point
for Ford to offer his own preferred set of neoliberal free
market reforms but allowed him to construct an inclusive
conception of ‘the people’ that cut across racial and eth-
nic lines. Thus, Ford’s populism stands apart from other
recent populist leaders who have ascended to power
on the back of anxieties about social or cultural change.
Rather, Ford can be understood as part of a broader his-
torical lineage of Canadian right-wing populism, where
ethnic, cultural, and social concerns have been marginal-
ized in favour of a unified focus on formal political equal-
ity and market-based reforms to government programs
(Farney, 2019; Farney & Koop, 2017; Sawer & Laycock,
2009). Ford’s promotion of middle-class identity as a uni-
fying signifier is firmly in line with this ideological lineage.
On a broader level, Ford’s campaign demonstrates
the contextually contingent nature of successful itera-
tions of populism. The leveraging of neoliberal and anti-
cosmopolitan appeals represents ideological tenets that
have significant currency in the unique political context
of Ontario where a large and ethnically diverse propor-
tion of citizens reside in seat-rich suburban ridings. As
mentioned, Ford’s brother, Rob, rode similar populist
themes to serve a tumultuous term as Mayor of Toronto,
successfully mobilizing disenchantment toward down-
town elites to create an ethnically diverse coalition of
support among suburban voters (Kiss et al., 2019; Silver
et al., 2019). This geographic divide between out-of-
touch urban elites and ordinary people residing in sub-
urbs played a key role in the PC’s victory in 2018 as well.
The coupling of neoliberal and anti-cosmopolitan dis-
courses capable of transcending racial and ethnic divides
sheds insight into the ways in which populism—at least
electorally successful examples—conform to the specific
social, cultural, and political contexts inwhich they unfurl
(Budd, 2019; Moffitt, 2016). Ford’s success in the 2018
election should also be understood as an outcome of the
resonance of his neoliberal populist discourse within the
unique political cultural of Ontario. While initially popu-
lated by Anglo-Celtic residents, successive waves of im-
migration since the 1950s have transformed Ontario into
a highly diverse multicultural province with a political
culture that privileges inclusiveness, fair treatment, and
equality (Woolstencroft, 2016). However, Ontario’s polit-
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ical culture has also maintained many of its ‘red Tory’
roots centred on a view of government as being respon-
sible for fostering economic success and demonstrating
managerial efficiency. Ford’s non-exclusionary brand of
neoliberal populism focused on free market managerial-
ism has a natural symbiosis within this cultural and polit-
ical context.
On the surface then, Ford’s blending of neoliberal
ideology and populist discourse distinguishes him from
other right-wing populists. Moreover, the absence of
xenophobia and nativism in Ford’s appeals to Ontarians
renders comparisons between Ford and other populists
made during and after the election largely unsupported.
The analysis offered in this article may serve as evidence
to support the conclusion that Canada is immune to
the wave of radical right-wing populism that has infil-
trated other countries (Adams, 2017). However, while
there is an absence of overt appeals to cultural and
ethnic divisions, we should not assume that Ford’s ne-
oliberal populist discourse during the election is free of
racialized elements. Rather, we might reasonably inter-
pret the absence of explicit discursive appeals to cul-
tural or ethnic signifiers as an outcome of the neoliber-
alization of multicultural discourse that has been crafted
by right-wing politicians and parties in Canada over the
last three decades. As Kwak (2019, p. 1709) notes, con-
servative politicians have engaged in a gradual process
of “racial realignment” whereby right-wing policies and
electoral platforms have been re-encoded with neolib-
eral signifiers as part of efforts to appeal to immigrant
communities. This neoliberal reimaging of racial and eth-
nic difference has allowed right-wing leaders and par-
ties to strengthen their appeal to non-white communi-
ties by demarcating these communities between ideal
and non-ideal neoliberal subjects. The former are de-
fined as those imbued with an entrepreneurial spirit and
independence for whom ethnic and religious differences
becomemuted through economic integration. The latter
category has been branded with the label ‘special inter-
ests’ and deemed undesirable based on their lack of eco-
nomic value and the unreasonable demands they direct
toward the state for group-based accommodation (Kwak,
2018). Thus, the importance of ‘special interests’ within
Ford’s discourse is well in line with the broader evolu-
tion of right-wing political discourse in Canada whereby
racial social hierarchies have become reinforced by seem-
ingly neutral, inclusionary neoliberal subjectivities. It is
important that future studies of populism in Canada and
elsewhere consider these subtle and often covert ne-
oliberal racial politics when analyzing and studying pop-
ulist leaders.
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